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FROZEN RIGHTS IN CANADA: CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION AND THE TRICKSTER
John Borrows*
The trickster is alive and well. The Supreme Court of Canada illustrated this
in the recent cases of R. v. Vanderpeet,' R. v. Gladstone,2 R v. N.TC.
Smokehouse3 and R. v. Pamajewon' when it considered how it would define
Aboriginal rights "recognized and affirmed" under section 35(1) of the Canadian
Constitution.! Until these judgments were released, the country's highest court
had supplied very little guidance concerning the test it would use to identify
those rights protected by section 35(1). In 1982 Aboriginal rights were placed
within Canada's newly patriated Constitutional Act, and outside of its Charter
of Rights and Freedoms,' at the insistence of many Aboriginal governments.7
*B.A., M.A., LL.B., LL.M., D.Jur., Associate Professor and Director of First Nations Legal
Studies, Faculty of Law at the University of British Columbia, of the Chippewas of the Nawash,
Ojibway/Anishinabe Nation. Thanks to Joel Bakan, Susan Boyd, Christine Boyle, Ron Delisle,
Doug Harris, Sakej Henderson, Nitya Iyer, Alan Manson, Kent McNeil, David Schneiderman, and
Don Stuart for their encouragement and comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. 137 D.L.R.4th 289, 9 W.W.R. 1. (Can. 1996). In Vanderpeet the accused was charged
under section 61(1) of the Fisheries Act, R.S.C. ch. F-14 (1970), with selling salmon caught under
the authority of an Indian food fishing license, contrary to section 27(5) of the British Columbia
Fishery (General) Regulations at SOR/84-248, which prohibited the sale or barter of fish caught
under such a license.
2. 137 D.L.R.4th 648, 9 W.W.R. I (Can. 1996). Gladstone the accused was charged under
section 61 (1) of the Fisheries Act with attempting to sell herring spawn on kelp caught under the
authority of an Indian food fish license, contrary to the same regulations used to charge
Vanderpeet, and of attempting to sell herring spawn on kelp caught without a license, contrary
to section 20(3) of the Pacific Herring Fishery Regulations at SOR183-324.
3. 137 D.L.R.4th 528, 9 W.W.R. 114 (Can. 1996). In Smokehouse the accused was an
incorporated company which owned and operated a food processing plant. They were charged
under section 61(1) of the Fisheries Act with selling and purchasing fish not caught under the
authority of a commercial fishing license, contrary to section 4(5) of the British Columbia
(General) Regulations, and of selling and purchasing fish contrary to section 27(5) of these same
regulations.
4. 138 D.L.R.4th 204 (Can. 1996). In Pamajewon the accused were charged under sections
201(l) and 206(1) of the Criminal Code with the offense of keeping a common gaming house
and conducting a scheme for the purposes of determining the winners of property.
5. Section 35(1) states: "The existing [Alboriginal and treaty rights of the [A]boriginal
peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed." Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canadian Act of 1982,
(U.K.), 1982, ch. 11. For information on the enactment of section 35(l), see Brian Slattery, The
Constitutional Guarantee of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights, 8 QUEEN'S L.J. 232 (1983); Kent
McNeil, The Constitutional Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada, 4 Sup. Cr. L. REv. 255
(1982); Douglas Sanders, The Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada, 61 CAN. BAR REv.
314 (1983).
6. Aboriginal rights were placed outside of the Canadian Charter to shield collective
Aboriginal rights from erosion due to its individualist orientation. See William Pentney, The
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Section 35(1) protected these rights by stating "ihe existing [A]boriginal and
treaty rights of the [A]boriginal people of Canada are hereby recognized and
affirmed."' The problem with this language was that no one was quite sure
what Aboriginal rights were, and therefore what, if anything, was being
protected.9
After the failure to define these rights through four high profile First
Ministers conferences, and a nationally negotiated Charlottetown Accord,"0 the
task of defining Aboriginal rights passed to the country's highest Court. The
Supreme Court of Canada's definitions of Aboriginal rights in these cases fell
far short of the large, liberal and generous interpretations of Aboriginal rights
considered throughout the political process," and urged by previous court
judgments."
Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada and the Constitution Act 1982, Part I. The
Interpretive Prism of s. 25, 22 U.B.C. L. REV. 21 (1988). Section 25 of the Constitutional Act
reflects this concern:
The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall not be
construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any [Alboriginal, treaty or other
rights or freedoms that pertain to the [A]boriginal peoples of Canada including
(a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal
Proclamation of October 7, 1763; and
(b) any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of land claims agreements
or may be so acquired
For judicial interpretation confirming this protection, see R v. Stienhuaer, [1985] 3 C.N.L.R. 187,
191 (Alta Q.B.); Barlow v. R., [1987] 1 C.N.L.R. 20, 44 (N.B.C.A.). For an excellent article
discussing the problems of imposing individual rights on Canadian Aboriginal peoples, see Mary
Ellen Turpel, Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpretive Monopolies, Cultural
Differences, 6 CAN. HUM. RTs Y.B. 3 (1989-1990).
7. Douglas Sanders, The Indian Lobby, in AND No ONE CHEERED: FEDERALISM,
DEMOCRACY AND THE CONSTTUTIONAL AcT 301-32 (Keith Banting & Richard Simeon eds.,
1983).
8. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitutional Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canadian Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, ch. 11.
9. Bryan Schwartz, Unstarted Business: Two Approaches to Defining s. 35 - What's in
the Box, and What Kind of Box?, in FIRST PRINCIPLES, SECOND THOUGHTS 353-64 (1986).
10. For an analysis of the First Ministers Conferences mandated by section 37 of the
Constitution, see Kathy Brock, The Politics ofAboriginal Self-Government: A Canadian Paradox,
34 CAN. PUB. ADMIN. 272 (1991). For suggestions building upon the Charlottetown Accord, see
Peter Hogg & Mary Ellen Turpel, Implementing Aboriginal Self-Government: Constitutional and
Jurisdictional Issues, 74 CAN. BAR REV. 187 (1995).
11. The most recent example of the wider view of Aboriginal rights which can emerge from
the political process is found in the final report of The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.
1-5 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES (1996). This report
summarizes and extends many ideas for protecting and improving Aboriginal rights within
Canada.
12. Previous cases which held that Aboriginal rights should be given a large, liberal, and
generous interpretation include Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1899); Nowegijick v. The
Queen, 144 D.L.R.3rd 193, 198 (Can. 1983); R. v. Simon, 24 D.L.R.4th 390, 435 (Can. 1985);
R. v. Sioui, 70 D.L.R.4th 427, 453 (Can. 1990).
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The Supreme Court was asked to consider the meaning of Aboriginal rights
in the context of criminal charges brought against Aboriginal people under
sections of the Fisheries Act and Criminal Code. In the Pamajewon case,
charges were laid under the Canadian Criminal Code for keeping a common
gaming house and conducting a scheme for the purposes of determining the
winners of property. 3 The Canadian Supreme Court held that Aboriginal rights
did not include "high stakes gambling" and were not a defense to the
convictions entered under the Criminal Code. In the Vanderpeet, Smokehouse
and Gladstone cases charges were laid under the Fisheries Act for exchanging
fish for money without possessing a commercial fishing license. These cases
were more varied in their results.
In Vanderpeet and Smokehouse, the Court held that these particular groups
did not have an Aboriginal right to sell and exchange fish, while in Gladstone
the Court ruled that the group in question did possess such a right. This latter
ruling was significant in Canadian jurisprudence because for the first time the
Court held that it is possible for Aboriginal peoples to possess commercial-like
rights to harvest and sell resources within their territories. However, these
rulings are also important because in arriving at these conclusions the Court
seriously undermined the future commercial competitiveness and survival of
Aboriginal nations in contemporary Canadian society. This comment will focus
on the Court's partiality concerning the contemporary nature of aboriginal
rights.
First Nations have an intellectual tradition that teaches about ideas and
principles that are partial and incomplete. The elders teach these traditions
through a character known as the trickster. 4 He has various persona in
different cultures. The Anishinabe (Ojibway) of the Great Lakes call the
trickster Nanabush; the First Nations people of the coastal North-west know him
as Raven; he is known as Glooscap by the Mi'kmaq of the Maritimes; and as
Coyote, Crow, Wisakedjak, Badger, or Old Man among other First Nations
people in North America. The trickster offers insights through encounters which
are simultaneously altruistic and self-interested. 5 In his adventures the trickster
13. R.S.C. ch. C-46 (1985).
14. The trickster's role is revealed in a brief exchange from an interview between Lenore
Keeshig-Tobias (an Anishinabe story-teller from my reservation) and Harmut Lutz:
H.L.: Was that your idea, founding the society for the Reawakening of the
Trickster?
LKT: The Committee to Re-Establish the Trickster. You know, this is to learn
from mistakes. The Trickster, The Teacher is a paradox: Christ-like in a way.
Except that from our Teacher, we learn through the Teacher's mistakes as well
as the Teacher's virtues.
HARMUT LUTZ. CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES: CONVERSATIONS WITH CANADIAN AuTHoRS 85
(1991).
15. PENNY PETRONE, NATIvE LITERATURE IN CANADA: FROM ORAL TRADITION TO THE
PRESENT 16 (1990).
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roams from place to place and fulfills his goals by using ostensibly contradictory
behaviors such as charm and cunning, honesty and deception, kindness and
mean tricks. 6 The trickster also displays transformative power as he takes on
new persona in the manipulation of these behaviors and in the achievement of
his objectives.' 7 Lessons are learned as the trickster engages in actions which
in some particulars are representative of the listener's behavior, and on other
points are uncharacteristic of their comportment." The trickster encourages an
awakening of understanding because listeners are compelled to interpret and
reconcile the notion that their ideas may be partial. As such, the trickster assists
people in conceiving of the limited viewpoint they possess. The trickster is able
to kindle these understandings because his actions take place in a perplexing
realm that partially escapes the structures of society and the order of cultural
things. 9 The trickster's interaction with the Supreme Court of Canada
demonstrates these insights.2
This comment draws upon this intellectual tradition and sites Nanabush at the
center and edge of recent Aboriginal rights cases from the Supreme Court of
Canada. It examines these judgments by alternatively interchanging Anishinabe
16. GERALD VIZENOR, THE PEOPLE NAMED THE CHIPPEWA: NARRATIVE HISTORIES 3-4
(1984). Vizenor states:
Nntanabozho, the compassionate woodland trickster, wanders in mythic time and
transformational space between tribal experiences and dreams. The trickster is
related to plants and animals and trees; he is a teacher and healer in various
personalities who, as numerous stories reveal, explains the values of healing ....
More than a magnanimous teacher and transformer, the trickster is capable of
violence, deceptions, and cruelties; the realities of human imperfections. The
woodland trickster is an existential shaman in the comic mode, not an isolated and
sentimental tragic hero in conflict with nature.
Id.
17. For a composite Trickster Story, see Thomas King, The One About Coyote Going West,
in ALL MY RELATIONS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF CANADIAN NATIVE FICTION 89 (William Hebert
New ed., 1990).
18. Daniel David Moses, The Trickster Theatre of Tomson Highway, 60 CAN. FICTION MAO.
83 (1987).
19. See Barbara Babcock Adams, A Tolerated Margin of Mess: The Trickster and His Tales
Reconsidered, 11 J.of Folklore Inst. 147 (1975); Henry Rowe Schooleraft, Historical and
Methodological Perspectives, in ANDREW WIGET, CRITICAL ESSAYS ON NATIVE AMERICAN
LrrERATuRE 21 (1985); John Borrows, Constitutional Law From a First Nations Perspective:
Self-Government and the Royal Proclamation, 28 U.B.C. L. REV. 1, 6-10 (1994); GERALD
VIZENOR, THE TRICKSTER OF LIBERTY: TRIBAL HEIRS TO A WILD BARONAGE (1988).
20. The trickster's interaction with the court is an effective vehicle for examining law
because: "Stories are a great device for probing the dominant narrative. We use them to examine
presupposition, the body of received wisdoms that pass as truth but actually are contingent,
power-seiving, and drastically disadvantage our people." Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Final
Chronicle: Cultural Power, The Law Reviews, and the Attack on Narrative Jurisprudence, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 545, 549 (1995); see also Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45
Burr. L. REV. 141 (1997) (describing foundationalist and anti-foundationalist uses of narrative
in law).
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and Canadian jurisprudential narratives and providing commentary on what this
exchange reveals. The distinctions highlighted within this encounter accentuate
where confusion, misinformation and self-contradiction appear in the Supreme
Court's story about Aboriginal rights." The trickster's unique placement
generates a language between "western" and "Aboriginal" accounts of law,"
which incorporates intersecting and oppositional cultural perspectives.'
Following this approach develops a perspicuous contrast, or vocabulary of
comparison, between the Court's narration and First Nation understandings, and
renders a clearer reflection on the appropriateness of the cases' analysis and
effects.' Thus, this methodology simultaneously frames and centers the
judgments as the trickster stands inside and outside of the Court, both as a
member and as one of its critics. His appearance provides alternative
constitutional interpretations,' and reveals the cultural construction and
contingency of law. The trickster's incongruous entry into legal discourse
presents law from a perspective which is outside of the conventional structure
of legal argument and exposes its hidden cultural (dis)order.27
Seegwun
Seegwun - spring. Nanabush is walking up a stream. Around his ankles the
water breaks free and flees to the Nottawasaga River. Imprisoned as ice for too
long it hurries its escape towards Georgian Bay and Lake Huron. He notices the
water's rush is met by travelers going in the opposite direction. Fish run into
and through the water's swollen charge. In the midst of this collision there are
21. For a series of articles that examines the similarities and differences between
jurisprudence and stories, see PETER BROOKS & PAUL GEWIRTZ, LAW'S STORIES (1996).
22. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND
LEGAL CRITICISM (1990). "To attempt to translate puts you in a place between texts, between
languages." Id. at 255.
23. See JURGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE
ETHICS (1993).
24. For further discussion on the use of this methodology, see 2 Charles Taylor,
Understanding and Etimocentricity, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCE: PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS 116-33 (1985); Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM AND
THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION (Amy Gutman & Charles Taylor eds., 1992); Borrows, supra note
19, at 1-10.
25. For a discussion of how racialized perspectives can create alternative legal interpretations,
see Richard Devlin, We Can't Go On Together with Suspicious Minds: Judicial Bias and
Racialized Perspective in R. v. R.D.S., 18 DALHOUSIE L.J. 408 (1995).
26. See John Borrows, Living Between Water and Rocks: First Nations, Environmental
Planning and Democracy, 47 U.T.L.J. 417 (1997).
27. In this sense the Trickster's methodology has similarities with objectives often
associated with critical race theory, see Introduction in MARI MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT
WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4-7
(Charles Lawrence et al. eds., 1993); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEPHANIC, FAILED
REVoLuTIONS: SOCIAL REFORM AND THE LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION (1994).
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periods of rest. In a shallow pool Nanabush spots a solitary rainbow trout. He
breaks the walls of a downstream beaver dam. He waits. Within a few minutes
the water in the pool goes down. Trapped, the fish has nowhere to go. Another
prisoner caught on life's precarious road. He walks towards it, slowly puts his
fingers under its belly, and feels the weight of life within. Nanabush lifts the
fish into the next pool and watches it swim away.
Neebin
Neebin - summer. Nine people are dressed in red, with white ermine framing
their costumes. They are wearing their traditional regalia.' It is the members
of the Supreme Court of Canada, asked to consider the meaning of Aboriginal
rights in the context of criminal charges laid against Aboriginal people
exchanging fish for money. Their Chief Justice, Antonio Lamer, is delegated to
speak for the group. The Chief Justice steps into court. He notices that
Aboriginal rights are "held by [Alboriginal people because they are
[A]boriginal. '29 With this as his starting point, to define Aboriginal rights he
is going to have to tell us what Aboriginal means. How is he going to do this?
Maybe he knows what it means to be Aboriginal. He writes: "The Court must
define the scope of section 35(1) in a way which captures both the [A]boriginal
and the rights in [A]boriginal rights."" He will define Aboriginal by
"capturing" the Aboriginal and the right? How is he going to do this? What will
he do once he captures it? He searches for a purpose, that might help him. In
the jurisprudential stream behind him, he sees a purposive rationale and a
foundation to explain "the special status that [A]boriginal peoples have within
Canadian society."'" He pulls the sticks from this structure; a deluge ensues.
Aboriginal rights in section 35(1) exist "because of one simple fact: when
Europeans arrived in North America, [A]boriginal peoples were already here,
living in communities on the land, and participating in distinctive cultures, as
they had done for centuries."32
The Chief Justice is nearly washed away by this flood. When he pulled the
sticks he was standing on the wrong side of the weir and could have been
knocked over. If Aboriginal peoples have prior rights to land and participatory
governance, how did the Crown and Court gain their right to adjudicate here?
He has to stem the flow. He has to regain his footing. He plants a flag,
"[A]boriginal rights recognized and affirmed by section 35(1) must be directed
towards their reconciliation of the pre-existence of [A]boriginal societies with
28. The Supreme Court of Canada wear these robes as a symbol of respect for the judicial
office.
29. See Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, at para. 19 (Lamer, CJ.C.).
30. Id. at para. 20.
31. Id. at para. 27.
32. Id. at para. 30.
[Vol. 22
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the sovereignty of the Crown."33 He now has a purpose with which to capture
both the Aboriginal and the right - "the reconciliation of pre-existing claims to
the territory that now constitutes Canada, with the assertion of British
sovereignty over that territory."' The assertion of non-aboriginal sovereignty
provides familiar ground from which to define Aboriginal."
Now comes the clairvoyant moment when he will tell us what Aboriginal
means. He reaches his fingers into the cold stream of past decisions; but there
is only one judgment he relies on to define Aboriginal. At his feet, in a shallow
pool of reasoning, the Chief Justice finds the Sparrow Court's acknowledgment
that the Aboriginal right to fish for food was considered to "ha[ve] always
constituted an integral part of their distinctive culture.' From this solitary line,
where the Court never doubted the Aboriginal's right to fish for food, the Chief
Justice tells us what Aboriginal means, and by extension what rights Aboriginals
possess. Aboriginal rights are those activities that are "integral to the distinctive
culture of the [A]boriginal group claiming the right."37 But what is integral to
being Aboriginal, and claiming rights? He takes another step, and sets out to
explain what is integral to Aboriginal people.
[Tihe test for identifying the [A]boriginal rights recognized and
affirmed by s[ection] 35(1) must be directed at identifying the
crucial elements of those pre-existing distinctive societies. It must,
in other words, aim at identifying the practices, traditions and
customs central to the Aboriginal societies that existed in North
America prior to contact with Europeans."
Integral thus means central, significant, distinctive, defining. The Chief Justice
notes: "a practical way of thinking about this problem is to ask whether, without
this practice, tradition or custom, the culture in question would be fundamentally
altered or other than what it WAS.139
With this test, as promised, Chief Justice Antonio Lamer has now told us
what Aboriginal means. Aboriginal is retrospective. It is about what was, "once
upon a time," central to the survival of a community, not necessarily about what
is central, significant and distinctive to the survival of these communities today.
His test invites stories about the past.4
33. Id. at para. 31.
34. Id. at para. 36.
35. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 572-74 (1823); Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542-43 & 559 (1832); R. v. Sparrow, 70 D.L.R.4th 385 (Can. 1990).
"[Tihere was from the outset, never any doubt, that sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed
the underlying title to such lands vested in the Crown." Id. at 404.
36. Sparrow, 70 D.L.R.4th at 398.
37. See Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, at para. 46 (Lamer, C.J.C.).
38. Id. at para. 44.
39. Id. at para. 59 (emphasis added); see also Id. at paras. 55-58.
40. This test has the potential to reinforce stereotypes about Indians. In order to claim an
No. 1]
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These stories speak about whether a protected Aboriginal right has its
"origins pre-contact",4 "prior to the arrival of Europeans"," because "it is the
fact that distinctive [A]boriginal societies lived on the land prior to the arrival
of Europeans that underlies the [Alboriginal rights protected by section 35(1),
it is to that pre-contact period that the courts must look in identifying
[A]boriginal rights."43  Aboriginal means a long time ago; pre-contact.
Aboriginal rights protect only those customs which have continuity with
practices existing before the arrival of Europeans. Aboriginal rights do not
sustain central and significant Aboriginal practices which developed solely as
a result of their contact with European cultures." The jurisprudential dam is
now back in place. A stagnant pool is once again beginning to fill. With this
judgment, the Chief Justice lifts the Aboriginal right and gently places it back
in this pool, behind some of its centuries long, common law encumbrances. As
he set out to do, he has captured both the Aboriginal and the right. Nanabush
waits.
A New Test For Defining Aboriginal Rights
As the above account reveals, the Canadian Supreme Court developed its
definition of Aboriginal rights by using a questionable definition of
Aboriginality. However, the Court's initial inquiry was appropriate, as it sought
to discover "the purposes behind section 35(1) as they relate to the scope of the
rights the provision is intended to protect."4 The Court properly found that the
"special legal and constitutional status of [A]boriginal peoples" existed to
reconcile "pre-existing [A]boriginal rights with the assertion of Crown
sovereignty."
Two reasons were advanced in support of this proposition. First, Aboriginal
people enjoy Constitutional protection "because of one simple fact: when
Europeans arrived in North America, [Alboriginal peoples were already here,
living in communities on the land, and participating in distinctive cultures, as
they had done for centuries."47 Second, Aboriginal rights were also placed
Aboriginal right, these determinations of Aboriginal will become more important than what it
means to be Aboriginal today. The notion of what was integral to Aboriginal societies is steeped
in questionable North American cultural images. See DANIEL FRANCIS, THE IMAGINARY INDIAN:
THE IMAGE OF THE INDIAN IN CANADIAN CULTURE (1992).
41. See Vanderpeer, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, at para. 62 (Lamer, C.J.C.).
42. Id. at para. 61.
43. IdH at para. 60.
44. Id. at para. 73.
45. Id. at para. 22.
46. The articulation of this second purpose, reconciliation, as a reason for the entrenchment
of section 35(1) in the Constitution was unexpected because it was not formerly a part of
Aboriginal rights jurisprudence.
47. See Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, at para. 30 (Lamer, C.J.C.). The justification for
this reason drew strongly from early U.S. jurisprudence in the Marshall cases. For commentary
[Vol. 22
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within the Constitution to reconcile the assertion of British sovereignty with the
pre-existing rights of Aboriginal peoples." The decision might not have been
as troubling had the Court stopped there, since its reasons seem to recognize
legal equality for Aboriginal people. However, in further searching for the
intention behind the entrenchment of Aboriginal rights, the Court applied
disturbing stereotypes of Aboriginal culture to frame the reconciliation it
suggested. It defined Aboriginal practices "prior contact with Europeans" as the
legally relevant date for reconciliation As a result, to establish an Aboriginal
right, Aboriginal peoples have to demonstrate that the practices for which they
seek protection are a "central and significant part of the society's distinctive
culture,"' "prior to the arrival of Europeans."5' In so ruling, the Court placed
those activities that developed solely as a result of European culture outside of
the protection of the Canadian Constitution.' This was reflected in
Nanabush's walk through the water, and the Chief Justice's walk through the
jurisprudence. This decision relegated Aboriginal peoples to the backwaters of
social development, deprived them of protection for practices that grew through
intercultural exchange, and minimized the impact of Aboriginal rights on non-
Aboriginal people.
In its reasons for judgment, the Court elaborated upon ten factors it would
consider in the application of the integral to a distinctive culture test. These
factors were articulated to provide guidance for future courts in defining
Aboriginal rights. They form an important insight on how the Court developed
the integral test. They also demonstrate the Court's limited cultural
understanding of Indigenous communities.'
First, in applying this new test the Court noted that it must consider the
perspective* of Aboriginal peoples themselves on the meaning of the rights at
on the Marshall cases, see Rennard Strickland, A Tale of Two Marshalls: Reflections on Indian
Law and Policy, The Cherokee Cases and the Cruel Irony of Supreme Court Victories, 47 OKLA.
L. REV. 111 (1994); Philip Frickey, Marshalling the Past and Present: Colonialism,
Constitutionalism and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REv. 381 (1993).
48. It is ironic that this assertion of British sovereignty should form one of the principal
bases and underlying purposes for the existence of Aboriginal rights. At its most simple level,
one might have thought that the assertion of British sovereignty was the last thing that would
inform the constitutionalized protection of Aboriginal rights, since it is almost always British
sovereignty that most severely threatens these rights. For criticism of the law's artificial and
self-serving acceptance of the Crown claims of sovereignty, see Brian Slattery, Understanding
Aboriginal Rights, 66 CAN. BAR REV. 727, 730 (1987).
49. See Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, at para. 44 (Lamer, CJ.C.).
50. Id. at para. 46.
51. Id. at paras. 55, 60.
52. Or to put the question affirmatively, in recognizing Aboriginal rights, one must ask
"whether or not a practice, tradition or custom was a defining feature of the culture in question"
prior to European influences. See Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, at para. 59 (Lamer, C.J.C.).
53. For a discussion of the court's limited understanding of Aboriginal culture, see Turpel,
supra note 6.
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stake. This factor for defining Aboriginal rights was first spoken of in the path-
breaking case of R. v. Sparrowe and was elaborated upon in Vanderpeet.
While the Sparrow Court observed that the Aboriginal perspective on their
rights was crucial, in Vanderpeet they modified this approach and stated that the
Aboriginal perspective must be "framed in terms cognizable to the Canadian
legal and constitutional structure,"5 to incorporate both Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal legal perspectives. This reformulation substantially weakened the
potential for Aboriginal claimants to express the law on their own terms,
according to their own customs. To facilitate an understanding among Canadian
judges, Aboriginal laws will need refraining and reinterpretation. This creates
the very real danger of mischaracterizing Aboriginal law in order to make it
"fit" another system, and thus not accurately protect the underlying context and
reason fcr the rule's existence within the Aboriginal community.' Curiously,
the Court reasoned that this approach best reconciles the prior occupation of
Canada with Crown sovereignty because it bridges two legal perspectives 7 It
seems unusual that the Aboriginal perspective on the meaning of their rights
must incorporate non-Aboriginal legal perspectives. One would think that the
Aboriginal perspective is needed precisely because the non-Aboriginal
perspective does not effectively reconcile the prior occupation of Canada with
assertions of Crown sovereignty. In the end, however, even the limited
protection of a mediated Aboriginal perspective may provide few benefits for
Aboriginal litigants, as the Court failed to invoke the Aboriginal perspective of
54. 70 D.L.R.4th 385, 411 (Can. 1990). For an excellent commentary on this case, see
Michael Asch & Patrick Macklem, Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essay on
R. v. Spanvow, 29 ALTA L. REv. 498 (1991). For a comparison with U.S. law, see Matthew D.
Wells, Sparrow and Lone Wof. Honoring Tribal Rights in Canada and the United States, 66
WASH. L. REV. 1119 (1991).
55. See Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.RAth 289, at para. 49 (Lamer C.J.C.).
56. For an elaboration of the difficulties encountered in articulating Aboriginal world-views
before common law courts, see Robin Riddington, Cultures in Conflict: The Problem of
Discourse, in NATIVE WRITERS AND CANADIAN WRTING 273 (William Herbert New ed., 1990);
LESLIE H. PiNDER, THE CARRIERS OF No: AFrER THE LAND CLAIMS TRIAL (1991); Joan Ryan
& Bernard Ominayak, The Cultural Effects of Judicial Bias, in EQUALITY AND JUDICIAL
NEUTRALIrrY 346 (Kathleen Mahoney & Sheilah Martin eds., 1987); Louise Mandell, Native
Culture on Trial, in EQUAITY AND JUDICIAL NEuTRALITY 358 (Kathleen Mahoney & Sheilah
Martin eds., 1989); Michael Jackson, The Case in Context, in COLONIALISM ON TRIAL:
INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS AND THE GITKSAN AND WEI'SuwETEN SOVEREIGNTY CASE X-Xi
(Don Monet & Sakau'u eds., 1992).
57. In dissent, Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dube stated "I do not think it appropriate to qualify
this propcsition by saying that the perspective of the common law matters as much as the
perspective of the native when defining [A]boriginal rights." Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, at
para. 145 (LHeureux-Dube, J).
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the rights in question in its subsequent decisions of Pamajewon, R. v. Cote
and R. v. Adans
The second factor the Court identified in determining integral Aboriginal
practices concerns the nature of the claim being made. The Court narrowed the
nature of claim being put forward, as it often does when considering collective
rights. ' The Chief Justice wrote that to define integral Aboriginal rights one
must identify the precise nature of the claim to determine whether the evidence
provided supports its recognition. The correct characterization of a claim
involved three considerations: "the nature of the action which the applicant
[was] claiming was done pursuant to an [A]boriginal right, the nature of the
governmental regulation, statute or action being impugned, and the tradition,
custom or practice being relied upon to establish the right."6' The application
of these steps in determining the precise nature of the claim asserted was a very
significant activity in all four cases. The Court's characterization of the claim
in some instances changed the very question the people were attempting to
litigate 2
For example, in Pamajewon it would not be an unfair reading of the case to
observe that the appellants were asserting a right to self-government. However,
since rights to Indian self-government have not yet been explicitly recognized
in Canadian jurisprudence, the Supreme Court considered that assertions of
Aboriginal rights to self-government were cast at a level of "excessive
58. 138 D.L.R.4th 385 (Can. 1996). In the Cote case, the issues were: whether an
Aboriginal right to fish must be necessarily incidental to a claim of Aboriginal title, and whether
section 35(1) protections outlined in Vanderpeet extended to areas included with the former
colonial regime of New France. The Court held that "[Alboriginal rights may exist independently
of [A]boriginal title' and that section 35(1) "would fail to achieve its noble purpose [if it] only
protected those defining features [of Aboriginal societies] which were fortunate enough to receive
the protection of European colonizers." ld. at paras. 38, 52, (Lamer, C.J.C.). Thus, Aboriginal
rights could extend to areas within the former colonial regime of New France.
59. 138 D.L.R.4th 657 (Can. 1996). The Adams case also addressed the issue of whether
Aboriginal rights are inherently based in claims to land, or whether claims to land are simply one
manifestation of a broader concept of Aboriginal rights. The Court held "[A]boriginal rights do
not exist solely where a claim to Aboriginal title has been made out." Itd at para. 26 (Lamer,
C.J.C.). It stated that the Vanderpeet test does not require that an Aboriginal group satisfy a
further hurdle of demonstrating that their connection to land where the activity was taking place
was of central significance to their distinctive culture.
60. For a discussion on the willingness of courts to alter the nature of claims to collective
rights, see Leon Trakman, Native Cultures in a Rights Empire: Ending the Dominion, 45 BUFF.
L. REV. 189, 196-212 (1997).
61. See Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, at para. 53 (Lamer, C.J.C.).
62. For a perceptive article that discusses the law's re-characterization of Aboriginal claims
because of its inability to directly address colonialism, see Mary Ellen Turpel, Home/Land, 10
CAN. J. FAM. L. 17, 34 (1991).
63. But see R. v. Sioui, 70 D.L.R.4th 427 (Can. 1990). Sioui provides for a recognition of
the existence of Aboriginal self-government in the historic period.
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generality.' 'M The court observed that if section 35(1) rights encompass claims
to self-government, which it did not decide, one must consider these claims in
the light of specific practices integral to the pre-contact Aboriginal culture. The
Court's re-characterization of the right illustrated its unwillingness to consider
self-government rights on any general basis.
This approach defeats many Aboriginal peoples' aspirations for a fuller
articulation of powers relative to the federal and provincial governments.O It
is clear that the current Court was unwilling to consider Aboriginal rights to
self-government on any global basis. Thus, in the Pamajewon case, tfie precise
nature of the right was characterized as a right to "participate in, and to regulate,
high stakes gambling activities on the reservation."' The Court rejected this
claim as an Aboriginal right and refused to consider it on a broader basis.
Similarly, in the Vanderpeet and Smokehouse cases, the Court also narrowed
the consideration of the claimed practice to a more precise articulation of the
potential right. These two cases held that the most accurate characterization of
the Aboriginal position consisted of a right "to exchange fish for money or other
goods."'67 Since the evidence in these cases did not support this more limited
right, it was not necessary to consider the nature of this right at a more general
level. However, in the Gladstone case, compelling evidence existed that the sale
and exchange of fish was integral to the Nation's culture, and thus the court
looked even further to determine whether there was an associated Aboriginal
right to trade on a commercial basis. It found that such a right existed, which
was a significant finding because it confirmed that Aboriginal peoples can
possess constitutionally-protected commercial rights. By holding that an
Aboriginal right could exist at this level of generality, the Court held out a thin
thread of hope for Aboriginal peoples seeking more encompassing rights. The
Gladstone case demonstrated that precise rights to a practice may also evidence
more general rights. This step by step approach to defining Aboriginal rights
underlines the Court's hesitancy to articulate them more broadly.
The third factor the court considered in the application of the integral to a
distinctive culture test concerned the centrality of the practice to the group
claiming the right. The majority wrote that "the claimant must demonstrate that
the practice, tradition or custom was a central and significant part of the
society's distinctive culture. 'M As noted previously, to have a practice
protected as a right the group must show that the activity was distinctive - a
defining feature of the culture. "A practical way of thinking about this problem
64. See Pamajewon, 138 D.L.R.4th 204, pam. 27 (Lamer, C.J.C.).
65. The legal basis for broader claims to self-government is set out in ROYAL COMM'N OF
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, PARTNERS IN CONFEDERATION: ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, SELF-GOVERNMENT
AND THE CONSrTUTION (1993).
66. See Pamajewon, 138 D.L.R.4th 204, at para. 26 (Lamer, C.J.C.).
67. See Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, at para. 76 (Lamer, CJ.C.); Smokehouse, 137
D.L.R.4th 528, at para. 21 (Lamer, C.I.C.).
68. See Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, at para. 58 (Lamer, C.J.C.).
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is to ask whether, without this practice, tradition or custom, the culture in
question would be fundamentally altered or other than what it [was]."' This
element of the court's test was based on a passage in Sparrow where the
Musqueam right to fish for food was stated to "ha[ve] always constituted an
integral part of their distinctive culture"."
One might question whether it was appropriate for the Court in Vanderpeet
to develop its test for the definition of Aboriginal rights from these observations,
since the Aboriginal right to fish for food in Sparrow was never open to serious
question. Furthermore, in the same paragraph, the Sparrow Court also wrote,
with equal authority, that the Musqueam "always fished for reasons connected
to their cultural and physical survival", and noted that "the right to do so may
be exercised in a contemporary manner".7 This raises an additional question
about why, in Vanderpeet, notions of survival and the contemporary exercise of
rights did not form part of the integral to a distinctive culture test, since the idea
of "integral" in Sparrow included the contemporary exercise of rights necessary
for physical and cultural survival. Aboriginal rights should exist to ensure
Indigenous peoples' physical and cultural survival, not necessarily to preserve
distinctive elements of pre-contact culture. The acceptance of these
considerations would have strengthened Aboriginal peoples interactions with
other Canadians, and been more consistent with the Court's previous rulings.
The fourth factor the Court articulated in determining whether an Aboriginal
practice is integral to a distinctive culture was whether they had continuity with
the activities which existed "prior to the arrival of the Europeans in North
America."'  The focus on pre-contact practices restricts contemporary
Aboriginal development. The rights of other Canadians are not limited to those
practices which have continuity with their activities prior to their first arrival in
North America. They would find such a limitation as the gravest form of
injustice. However, for the Court this factor was relevant in defining Aboriginal
rights "[b]ecause it [was] the fact that distinctive [A]boriginal societies lived on
the land prior to the arrival of Europeans that underlies the [A]boriginal rights
protected by section 35(1), it [was] to that pre-contact period that the courts
must look in identifying [A]boriginal rights."73 The two dissenting judgments
criticized this part of the majority's test as "freezing" Aboriginal rights,
contrary to the admonition found within Sparrow.' Justice L'Heureux-Dube
noted that the definition of Aboriginal rights by reference to pre-contact
practices inappropriately crystallized Aboriginal rights at an arbitrary date.75
69. Id. at para. 59 (Lamer, C.J.C.).
70. R. v. Sparrow, 70 D.L.R.4th 385, 401 (Can. 1990).
71. Id.
72. See Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, at para. 60 (Lamer, CJ.C.).
73. Id.
74. "[T]he phrase 'existing [A]boriginal rights' must be interpreted flexibly so as to permit
their evolution over time." Sparrow, 70 D.L.R.4th at 397.
75. See Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, at para. 167 (L'Heureux-Dube, J.).
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She argued this was contrary to the perspective of Aboriginal peoples, and
overstated the impact of European influence on Aboriginal peoples." Similarly,
Justice McLachlin stated that the majority's failure to recognize the distinction
between rights and contemporary form "freeze[s] [A]boriginal societies in their
ancient modes and den[ies] to them the right to adapt, as all peoples must, to
the changes in the society in which they live."' These dissenting judgments
implicitly recognize the inequity in creating non-Aboriginal rights following
contact and not extending this same entitlement to Aboriginal peoples.
After exploring the above four factors relevant to the application of the
integral to a distinctive culture test in some detail, the Court breezed through a
list of six other considerations appropriate to defining Aboriginal rights. They
wrote that in defining Aboriginal rights "[tihe courts must not undervalue the
evidence presented by the [A]boriginal claimants," simply because it did not
conform precisely with evidentiary standards in private litigation."8 This was
an important subsidiary qualification in defining integral rights rooted in the
ancient practices because difficulties will arise in obtaining certain evidence of
pre-contact European practices." The Court eased the evidentiary burden by
this admonishment.
The Court then stated that claims to Aboriginal rights were not general and
universal, but related to the specific history of the group claiming the right.'
The Court's failure to articulate general features of Aboriginal claims prevented
their expansion. If claimants cannot rely on the victories of other communities,
because cases may always be distinguishable through particular histories, then
this provides very little basis for Aboriginal peoples to build a principled,
protective jurisprudence. Yet, despite this disadvantage the Chief Justice wrote
that "[t]he fact that one group of [A]boriginal people has an [A]boriginal right
to do a particular thing will not be, without something more, sufficient to
demonstrate that another Aboriginal community has the same [A]boriginal
right." While there was a certain amount of truth in this statement that
Aboriginal rights are fact and site specific, these reasons ignore a more global
basis for Aboriginal rights. "Aboriginal rights are rooted in an overarching
jurisprudential infrastructure ... First Nation's laws are integral to the exercise
of all Aboriginal rights."' The Court failed to recognize that one right that all
76. I. at paras. 165-67.
77. hI. at para. 240 (McLachlin, J.).
78. Id. at para. 68 (Lamer, C.J.C.).
79. For evidentiary problems in Aboriginal rights litigation, see Michael Asch & Catherine
Bell, Definition and Interpretation of Fact in Canadian Aboriginal Title Litigation: An Analysis
of Delgainuukw, 19 QUEEN's L.J. 503 (1993-1994); Clay McLeod, The Oral Histories of
Canada's Northern Peoples, Anglo-Canadian Evidence Law, and Canada's Fiduciary Duty
to First Nations: Breaking Down the Barriers of the Past, 30 ALTA. L. Rav. 1276 (1992).
80. See Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, at pam. 69 (Lamer, C.J.C.).
81. Id.
82. John Borrows, With or Without You: First Nations Law (in Canada), 41 MCGILL LJ.
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Aboriginal peoples possess as an integral right was their organization in
societies according to their traditions, customs and laws.' The organization and
laws of Aboriginal peoples were universally protected as something each group
could successfully claim, though it was true their content varied from group to
group.
A seventh factor to consider in applying the integral test was that the claimed
practice contain independent significance to the community, and not be a mere
incidence to another tradition. Without providing justification or reasons the
court wrote that "[i]ncidental practices, customs and traditions cannot qualify as
[A]boriginal rights through a process of piggybacking on integral practices,
customs and traditions."' This assertion seems contrary to the Court's earlier
ruling in R. v. Simon, where incidental practices were protected as Aboriginal
rights.' It also suggests that, while the Court was willing to protect
independent rights in the abstract, it was unwilling to preserve the place and
means necessary to make the exercise of rights meaningful. Only the future will
reveal if and how the Court will resolve this seeming contradiction.
The other three factors the Court identified as important in determining
Aboriginal rights involved the "distinctive" nature of the Aboriginal practice."
A distinctive practice is one that does not arise solely as a response to European
influences," and which can arise separately from the Aboriginal group's
relationship to the land." Distinctiveness and the European influence on
Aboriginal rights have been touched upon elsewhere in this comment and will
receive no further attention at this point. However, the idea that Aboriginal
rights may arise not only from prior occupation of land, but from the prior
social organization and distinctive cultures of Aboriginal people is novel. Prior
to these cases it was not clear whether Aboriginal rights arose only through
claims to Aboriginal title.' Now it is clear that Aboriginal title does not
necessarily need the requisite proof to sustain other Aboriginal rights. Section
35(1) of the Constitution is emerging as the most relevant criteria in defining
Aboriginal rights in Canada. The subsequent Supreme Court cases of Adams
and Cote followed this approach, wherein it was held that Aboriginal peoples
631, 645-6 (1996) [hereinafter Borrows II].
83. The court does not recognize that Aboriginal laws are universally protected Aboriginal
rights even though they note that traditional laws form the basis of Aboriginal rights in an earlier
part of the judgment. See Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, at para. 42 (Lamer C.J.C.).
84. Id at para. 70.
85. R. v. Simon, 24 D.L.R.4th 390 (Can. 1985) (the Aboriginal accused had a right to carry
a gun in closed season on his hunting grounds because its possession was reasonably incidental
to his protected treaty right to hunt in all seasons).
86. See Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, at paras. 71-72 (Lamer, CJ.C.).
87. Id. at par. 73.
88. Id. at para. 74.
89. For the inappropriateness of applying the "integral" test to aboriginal title, see Kent
McNeil, The Meaning of Aboriginal Title, in ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTs IN CANADA:
EsSAYS ON LAW, EQUALITY, AND RESPECT FOR DIFFERENCE 135-54 (Michael Asch ed., 1997).
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in Quebec could claim food fishing rights, even if they had not established
Aboriginal title in the area in question. 0
The net effect of these ten considerations is to circumscribe Aboriginal rights
and bring them more fully under the cultural assumptions of the common law.
They establish non-Aboriginal characterizations of Aboriginality," evidencen
and law 3 as the standards against which Aboriginal rights are measured. Taken
together, these factors compel the conformity of Aboriginal rights to "western"
formulalions of law in order to find recognition and affirmation in Canada's
constitulion. This creates problems for Aboriginal groups since these norms are
generally not sensitive to the Aboriginal perspective on the meaning of the
rights at stake 4 and consequently constrain the reception of Aboriginal
viewpoints. Yet, the Court should not interpret these rights in such an inflexible
and narrow manner0s The trickster conveys this principle.
Tahwahgi
Tahwahgi - Fall. The Couchiching Narrows, Orillia, Ontario. Nanabush has
recently presided over the opening of the casino on the Chippewas of the Rama
reservation. Confined for over a century, Anishinabe self-government has
escaped federalism's cells and now spills into the surrounding communities.
Over one-hundred thousand people travel to Rama and drop quarters in the
Casino's well. The Woodland art of its outer walls encloses the interaction of
mean tricks and kindness, help and neglect, charm and cunning. The rush to get
into self-government's outward flow has its periods of rest too. Nanabush takes
the three minute walk to the Lake. On the water the boat's sails hang loosely.
For 4000 years an Aboriginal weir raked these Narrows to trap fish behind its
wooden bars. Now behind the Lake's shores the fingers of a new presence
reach out. Nanabush looks back towards it; thinks about how he placed it
90. See R. v. Cote, 138 D.L.R.4th 385 (Can. 1996); R. v. Adams, 138 D.L.RAth 657 (Can.
1996).
91. For accounts that problematize non-aboriginal accounts of aboriginality, see Ghislain
Otis, Opposing Aboriginality to Modernity: The Doctrine of Aboriginal Rights in Canada, 12
BRITISH J. CANADIAN STUD. 1 (1997), and Gillian Cowlishaw, Did the Earth Move for You? The
Anti-Mabo Debate, 6 AUSTRALIAN J. ANTHROPOLOGY 32 (1995).
92. For commentary on non-aboriginal interpretations of aboriginal evidence, see Geoff
Sherrott, The Court's Treatment of the Evidence in Delgamuukw v. B.C., 56 SASK. L. REv. 441
(1992); Louis Assier-Andrieu, Anthropology as the Eye of the Law: Comment on Canadian
Jurisprudence, 33 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 179 (1993); Marlee Kline, The Colour of Law:
Ideological Representations of First Nations in Legal Discourse, 3 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUD. 451
(1994).
93. For a critique of the application of non-aboriginal characterizations of aboriginal law, see
COLONIALISM ON TRIAL: INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS AND THE GITKSAN AND WETSUwETEN
SOVEREIGNTY CASE (Don Monet & Sakau'u eds., 1992)
94. R. v. Sparrow, 70 D.L.R.4th 385, 411 (Can. 1990).
95. See John Borrows, Contemporary Traditional Equality: The Effect of the Charter on
First Nation Politics, 43 U.N.B.L.J. 19 (1994).
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perfectly. Buses disgorge their contents, cars and trains arrive every few
minutes, the people of the reserve are also swept into its flow; its grasp is
extensive.
North of Rama, Chief Justice Antonio Lamer presides over the fate of two
casinos on the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake reservations. It is the Pamajewon
case. The communities have risked asking the Court to rule that Aboriginal
rights to self-government include high-stakes gambling. The outward rush into
these communities is just beginning to build. The land is cleared for a new
gaming hall and hotel, and signs on the highway announce the arrival of
monster bingo. The Chief Justice takes a thirty-two paragraph stroll around the
place. With Vanderpeet as a companion - a "legal standard against which the
appellants' claim must be measured"' - he tells us the character of Aboriginal
rights. Once again he gets to decide the character traits. He not only defines the
character of an Aboriginal, he defines the character of an entire Aboriginal
community. How is he going to do this? Can he identify the character of
another culture? He consults his companion. Vanderpeet has some words of
advice: change the characterization of what the Aboriginal people are claiming.
The Chief Justice agrees; that makes it easier. He confides:
To characterize an applicant's claim correctly, a court should
consider such factors as the nature of the action which the applicant
is claiming was done pursuant to an [A]boriginal right, the nature
of the governmental regulation, statute or action being impugned,
and the tradition, custom or practice being relied upon to establish
the right."
The Chief Justice provides three factors to consider in developing the correct
characterization of a claim, there is no mention of standards by which one
should judge these factors. What principles will guide judgments about the
characterization of these factors? Should Aboriginal claims be characterized in
a large, liberal and generous manner,"8 with sensitivity to the "[A]boriginal
perspective on the meaning of the rights at stake"?' Nope. No mention of that
here. With that out of the way, the Chief Justice provides his own
characterization of what is being claimed.
He walks on. The people want him to see how the band participates in
deciding who lives where on the reserve, and under what conditions. He is
invited to tour the band council office, read their governing bylaws, see how the
people depends on them. He declines. He stays out near the road. The Chief
Justice turns his attention to the empty casino land, sees the monster being
advertised. In the next breath, he states, "When these factors are considered in
96. See Pamajewon, 138 D.L.R.4th 204, at para. 23 (Lamer, C.J.C.).
97, Id. at para. 26.
98. R. v. Sioui, 70 D.L.R.4th 427, 453 (Can. 1990).
99. R. v. Sparrow, 70 D.L.R.4th 385, 404 (Can. 1990).
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this case it can be seen that the correct characterization of the appellants' claim
[is] that they [are] claiming the right to participate in, and to regulate, high
stakes gambling activities on the reservation"."° His short promenade sidesteps
claims about Aboriginal rights to self-government. "The appellants themselves
would have this Court characterize their claim as to 'a broad right to manage the
use of their reserve lands.' To so characterize the appellants' claim would be
to cast the Court's inquiry at a level of excessive generality.''. This is a
comfortable pace. One needs to get a little exercise, but no use over-extending
yourself. "The factors laid out in Vanderpeet, and applied, supra, allow the
Court to consider the appellants' claim at the appropriate level of specificity;
the characterization put forward by the appellants would not allow the Court to
do so.""la It is too high a level of generality to think that Aboriginal people
would actually have a broad right to manage the use of their own lands.
The Chief Justice is almost through with his visit. It is getting dark. He just
has something to dispose of before he leaves - whether Shawanaga and Eagle
Lake's "participation in, and regulation of, gambling on reserve lands was an
integral part of their distinctive culture.""un The evidence "d[oes] not
demonstrate that gambling, or that the regulation of gambling, was of central
significance to the Ojibway people." Prior to contact, informal gambling
activities took place on a "small scale." The Chief Justice refers to a prior
visitor: "I also agree with the observation made by Flaherty Prov. Ct. J...
commercial lotteries such as bingo [were] a twentieth century phenomena and
nothing of the kind existed amongst [A]boriginal peoples and was never part of
the mtns by which these societies were traditionally sustained or
socialized.""' Done. End of the trail. The claim is defeated since Anishinabe
gambling, prior to contact, was not done on a twentieth century scale. Hardly
surprising that this standard of evidence could not be met. Not many activities
in any society, prior to this century, took place on a twentieth-century scale. It
is a good thing the rights of other Canadians do not depend on whether such
rights were important to them two to three hundred years ago. What would it
be like for Canadians to have their fundamental rights defined by what was
integral to European people's distinctive culture prior to their arrival in North
America?"
The door slams. The Chief Justice drives away. Self-government will serve
more time in isolation, locked within federalism's cells. Very few people will
100. See Pamajewon, 138 D.L.RAth 204, at para. 26 (Lamer, CJ.C.).
101. Id. at para. 27.
102. Id.
103. Id. at para. 28.
104. Id. at para. 29.
105. Unfortunately, some Canadians may know exactly what it is like to have fundamental
rights defined by what was integral to European culture prior to its arrival in North America.
People disadvantaged on the basis of sex, class, race, etc., may well feel their rights depend on
what was defining European culture 200-300 years ago.
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visit Shawanaga and Eagle Lake, even fewer will leave their money behind.
The people of Shawanaga and Eagle Lake will not spend the rest of their lives,
and that of their children's children, caught inside a casino." The fresh
October wind is brisk. Clear. Orange and yellow leaves dance in this breeze,
and mimic the setting autumn sun. A walk to shore reveals Indian fishers
pulling in their nets. Whitefish and trout will be served tonight. Lake Huron has
witnessed this activity for centuries. No buses, trains or cars crowding the life
out of the community. No new presence - no grasping; quiet settles back into
the familiar rhythms of activity.
An Alternative Basis for the Constitutional
Entrenchment of Aboriginal Rights
As the preceding account reveals, the idea that Aboriginal peoples will have
to base the source and temporal roots of their rights in their historic presence -
their ancestry - in North America and reconcile these with Crown sovereignty
is disputed." As Justice McLachlin noted in dissent,
Aboriginal rights find their source not in a magic moment of
European contact, but in the traditional laws and customs of the
[A]boriginal people in question.... One finds no mention in the
text of s[ection] 35(1) or in the jurisprudence of the moment of
European contact as the definitive all-or-nothing time for
establishing an [A]boriginal right."'
Even the majority judgment in these cases mentioned the fact that traditional
laws and customs were the basis for Aboriginal rights." The current
Supreme Court test defines Aboriginal rights as those rooted in practices which
were central to their societies prior to the arrival of European culture, and not
solely a result of European influence. Therefore, if the purposes underlying the
existence of section 35(1) in the Constitution were even slightly differently
conceived, then the test defining an Aboriginal right would vary accordingly.
This was illustrated in Nanabush and the Chief Justice's visit to the casino.
Furthermore, the Aboriginal right's nexus to "crucial elements" of pre-
existing societies is, in the words of Justice McLachlin, too broad a
106. For an excellent novel where an Anishinabe writer has described this experience, see
LOUISE ERDRICH, THE BINGO PALACE (1994). For United States statute and case law dealing with
Indian gaming, see Naomi Mezey, The Distribution of Wealth. Sovereignty and Culture Through
Indian Gaming, 48 STAN. L. REv. 711 (1996); Kathryn Rand & Steven Light, Virtue of Vice?
How IGRA Shapes the Politics Of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J.
Soc. POL'Y & L. 380 (1997).
107. See Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, at par. 32 (Lamer, C.J.C.).
108. Id. at par. 247 (McLachlin, J.).
109. Id. at par. 40 (Lamer, C.J.C.).
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characterization of the rights, too indeterminate and too categorical.' The
first criticism of. this new test involved the over-broad denotation because
"integral is a wide concept, capable of embracing virtually everything that an
Aboriginal people customarily did.""' Moreover, the integral test is too
indeterminate because "one encounters the problem that different people may
entertain different ideas of what is distinctive, specific or central. To use such
concepts as the markers of legal rights is to permit the determination of rights
to be coloured by the subjective views of the decision maker."". Finally, the
integral to a distinctive culture test is inappropriately categorical because
"[w]hether something is integral is an all or nothing test. Once it is concluded
that a practice is integral to the people's culture, the right to pursue it obtains
unlimited protection, subject only to the Crown's right to impose limits on the
grounds of justification."".
An alternative basis for defining Aboriginal rights is the common law's
recognition .of the ancestral laws and customs "of the [Alboiginal peoples who
occupied land prior to European settlement.""" This basis for Aboriginal
rights is preferred to that of the majority because it is more in line with the
existing case law and the "time honoured methodology of the common
law.""' Under this new methodology, the Court would evaluate new
situations by reference to what the law recognized in the past. The Chief
Justice did not follow this methodology, but engaged in a more theoretical
approach to Aboriginal rights which reasoned from broad principles which
found little or no support in past judgments. On the other hand, Madam Justice
McLachlin's methodology and reasons followed a "golden thread" of case law
which defined the nature and incidents of Aboriginal rights by reference to the
laws and customs of Indigenous people."6 Her reasons led her to hold that
the purpose of section 35(1) was, first, to protect the existing customary laws
and rights of Aboriginal peoples and, second, to ensure that such customs and
rights remain in the Aboriginal people until extinguished or surrendered by
treaty. These two principles, according to McLachlin, were supported by the
common law and history, and "may safely be said to be enshrined in s[ection]
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.""' Thus for McLachlin, since Aboriginal
rights rested on Aboriginal laws, section 35(1) must define these rights by
reference to these pre-existing laws.
Yet, the Chief Justice's test defines Aboriginal rights according to
stereotypical perceptions of Aboriginal characteristics, rather than by their
110. Id. at paras. 256-60 (McLachlin, J.).
111. Ld. at para. 256.
112. Id. at para. 257.
113. Id. atpara. 258.
114. Id, at para. 263.
115. Id. at para. 261.
116. ld. atpara. 265.
117. Id. at para. 275.
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nature and source. This approach freezes the development of certain Aboriginal
practices in the distant past. For example, under the Chief Justice's reasoning,
an Aboriginal right does not include Aboriginal hunting rights to sell and
exchange furs because some argue this practice developed solely as a result of
European influence."' This understanding of Aboriginal rights cannot be
correct. The idea that Aboriginal people do not have rights which developed
solely in response to European influences is contrary to the history and the
very possibility of the exploration and early development of many parts of
North America."' This restriction of Aboriginal rights goes against the Chief
Justice's own observation that the rights developed from the "peculiar meeting
of two vastly different legal cultures."'m If Aboriginal rights developed
through the meeting of two cultures, then surely those practices which resulted
solely in response to European culture must encompass this legal regime.
Otherwise, it is difficult to see how the law is "intersocietal."' '2 Early
European presence in North America would have been frustrated if Aboriginal
people did not have rights to hunt and trade because some of these practices
developed through contact with Europeans. Europeans relied on the profit from
the fur trade and would have been seriously handicapped in asserting
sovereignty in North America if Aboriginal people had no rights to sell furs to
them." Furthermore, Aboriginal people themselves would also have rebelled
or refused to trade if anyone would have seriously suggested that they had no
rights to exchange or sell animals." Such a policy would have undermined
one of the principal reasons underlying colonial policy in the settlement of
Canada found in the Royal Proclamation's assertion that the "[t]rade with the
said Indians shall be free and open to all."'24 As such, the Lamer's holding
118. ARTHUR J. RAY, INDIANS IN THE FUR TRADE: THEIR ROLE AS TRAPPERS, HUNTERS,
AND MIDDLEMEN IN THE LANDS SOUTHWEST OF HUDSON BAY 1660-1870, at 51-57 (1974).
119. RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES AND REPUBLICS IN THE
GREAT LAKES REGION, 1650-1815, at 50-142 (1991); JAMES RODGER MILLER, SKYSCRAPERS
HIDE THE HEAVENS 23-82 (1989); OLIvE P. DICKASON, CANADA'S FIRST NATIONS: A HISTORY
OF FOUNDING PEOPLES FROM EARLIEST TIMES 86-215 (1992); 1 REPORT OF THE ROYAL
COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 99-137 (1996).
120. See Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, at para. 42 (Lamer, C.J.C.) (quoting Mark Walter,
British Imperial Constiutional Law and Aboriginal Rights: A Comment on Delagamuukw v.
British Columbia, 17 QUEEN'S LJ. 412-13 (1992)).
121. Id. (citing Brian Slaterly, The Legal Basis of Aboriginal Title, in ABORIGINAL TITLE
IN BRITISH COLUMBIA: DELGAMUUKW V. THE QUEEN 121-22 (1992)).
122. See generally, HAROLD ADAMS INNIS, FUR TRADE IN CANADA: AN INTRODUCTION TO
CANADIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY (1956).
123. In fact, Indians did rebel on those occasions where they were told they had no rights
to occupy and use their lands, see FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE AMBIGUOUS IROQUOIS EMPIRE (1975);
CORNELIUS JAENEN, FRIEND OR FOE: ASPECTS OF FRENCH-AMERINDIAN CULTURAL CONTACT
IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES (1976); LESLIE STOKES UPTON, MICMACS AND
COLONISTS, INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS IN THE MARITIMES (1979).
124. The Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1963, R.S.C., 1985, App. 11, No. 1; See Borrows,
supra note 19.
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does not comport with history or Aboriginal law if the development of
Crown/Aboriginal relations, which he himself described as "intersocietal law,"
was predicated on this denial of the continued development of Aboriginal
practices solely as a result of European influence."2
To take away the possibility that Aboriginal laws, traditions and practices
could develop and receive protection as rights in relation to the appearance of
European cultures is to take away the means to allow Aboriginal people to
compete on the same basis, with equal power, with the settling peoples. Why
is it that European laws, practices and traditions, some of which developed
solely through contact with Aboriginal peoples, are allowed to grow and
develop from the moment of contact, while Aboriginal laws and practices,
which also developed from the same moment of contact, are stifled in their
progression? Such a holding is contrary to the Chief Justice's assertion that
"the essence of [A]boriginal rights is their bridging of [A]boriginal and non-
[A]boriginal cultures."'" To accomplish this bridging of cultures and truly
render the Aboriginal perspective of Aboriginal rights in terms "cognizable to
Canadian law," as required by Lamer in the Vanderpeet case, true
reconciliation requires those in power to give "equal weight" to Aboriginal
law.17
The downgrading of Aboriginal rights is even more apparent in the greater
power given to Canadian governments to infringe Aboriginal rights in these
cases. In Gladstone, the majority provided strong obiter dicta stating that
Aboriginal rights must be capable of being limited and, as such, could be
infringed by justifiable government legislation." This potentially widens the
government's power to interfere with Aboriginal rights. Justifiable legislative
objectives could include "the pursuit of economic and regional fairness, and the
recognition of the historic reliance upon, and participation in, the fishery by
non-[A]boriginal groups."" This further potential for the infringement of
Aboriginal rights must be considered in the light of the fact that government
already has a generous two-step chance for justifying interference with
Aboriginal rights outlined in Sparrow.'" The concern that motivated the
125. A holding that denies the protection of Aboriginal practices which developed solely as
a result of European contact would also violate Canada's fiduciary obligation towards Aboriginal
peoples, to maintain the honor of the Crown in dealings with Aboriginal peoples. For discussion
of this doctrine, see LEN ROTMAN, PARALLEL PATHS: FIDUCIARY DOCTRINE AND THE CROWN-
NATIVE RELATIONSHIP IN CANADA (1996); David Elliot, Aboriginal Peoples in Canada and the
United States and the Scope of the Fiduciary Relationship, 24 MAN. L.J. 137 (1996); Peter W.
Hutchins et al., When Do Special Fiduciary Obligations to Aboriginal Peoples Arise?, 59 SASK.
L. REv. 9q (1995).
126. See Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.RAth 289, at par. 42 (Lamer, C.I.C.).
127. Id. at paras. 59-60.
128. See Gladstone, 137 D.L.R.4th 648, at par. 73 (Lamer, CJ.C.).
129. 1d at para. 75.
130. Under the Sparrow test for infringement, first, the Aboriginal group must demonstrate
a prima facie interference with theirrights because legislation is either unreasonable, causes undue
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widening of permissible legislative infringement in Gladstone was the lack of
any inherent limitation for Aboriginal people on the exercise of their rights.
This concern is curious, from an Aboriginal perspective, because there are
limitations placed on these rights - the laws and traditions of Aboriginal
peoples.' Aboriginal peoples have laws which dictate the appropriate
exercise of a right.'32 Furthermore, non-Aboriginal peoples exercise exclusive
rights all the time. In fact, exclusive rights are one of the distinguishing
features of western legal systems. Why should an extra concern arise when
Aboriginal peoples exercise exclusive rights? What can explain the concern in
assigning Aboriginal peoples exclusive rights, when the Court generally shows
no anxiety when allotting them to non-Aboriginal peoples?
The Chief Justice's failure to place equal weight on Aboriginal practices,
customs and traditions contradicts his stated purpose for the inclusion of
section 35(1) in the Constitution. The downgrading of Aboriginal practices
severely constrains true reconciliation between the assertion of Crown
sovereignty and the pre-existing rights of Aboriginal peoples. Reconciliation
usually requires that each party to a relationship concede something to the
other, and the majority's test does not require any relinquishment on the part
of the Crown in accomplishing this objective. Lamer's test compels only
Aboriginal peoples to give something up in reconciling the assertion of Crown
sovereignty with pre-existing Aboriginal occupation. For example, the integral
to a distinctive culture test requires Aboriginal peoples to concede any
protection for practices which may have developed solely as response to
European cultures. Yet since the adoption of new practices, traditions and laws
in response to new influences is integral to the survival of Aboriginal
communities, reconciliation should not require a concession of those practices
which allow them to survive as a contemporary community." By limiting
Aboriginal rights to integral practices not developed solely as a result of
European influences, the Court is denying these cultures the right to survive by
adapting to new situations never before encountered. This test appears to work
against Aboriginal peoples competing on an equal footing within Canadian
society, and extinguishes their contemporary vigor as dynamic, competitive
communities. Surely the Chief Justice could not have meant to uphold such a
result for the avowed noble purpose underlying section 35(1) of the
hardship, or denies the preferred means of exercising rights. If the group passes this test the court
still may hold that interference is justified if the Crown can show a valid legislative objective for
infringing the law, and demonstrate that the honor of the Crown was preserved in the enactment.
131. Although the Supreme Court of Canada has recently narrowed the bounds in which
First Nations laws can apply, see R. v. Nikal, 133 D.L.R.4th 658 (Can. 1996); R. v. Lewis, 133
D.L.R. 700 (Can. 1996).
132. Borrows II, supra note 82, at 646-57.
133. For a discussion about the importance of the continued interaction of state law and
customary Indigenous law, see Maria Teresa Sierra, Indian Rights and Customary Law in Mexico:
A Study of the Nahuas in the Sierra De Pueblo, 29 LAW & SoC'y REv. 227 (1995).
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Constitution."3 Once again, the trickster's engagement with the court can help
identify whether the Court has upheld such a purpose.
Peebon
Peebon - Winter. Frozen rights. Peebon's return always brings hardship,
decay and dissolution. His perpetual defeat of Neebin withers the plants,
hardens the ground and sends white beings through the skies. With his
approach the animals sleep, and fish return to deep lakes escaping the rivers'
congealing arteries. To the north, the ancient grandfathers retreat to their
lodges. Their fires reflect on the sky - blue, white and cold red, and illuminate
the path of souls for those traveling to the land of the dead. Some time will
pass before the grandfather's voices again accompany the clouds and let their
fire fall across the earth. For now, they remain in their lodges, protect their
fires, and await the return of Neebin. Peebon and Neebin's perpetual quest for
supremacy continually enforces this cycle on the Anishinabe. While Peebon is
in the ascendancy, Nanabush looks for ways to steal fire from the grandfathers,
to bring it back to the Anishinabe and keep them warm.
Peebon's frigid sovereignty has wide dominion. Aboriginal practices that
developed solely as a response to European culture are now frozen, courtesy
of the "integral test." How can one reconcile this with Chief Justice Antonio
Lamer's own observation that Aboriginal rights developed from the "peculiar
meeting of two vastly different legal cultures." 3 Nanabush stalks the land and
looks for ways to steal fire. He approaches the common law warily. He might
get burn,. With suspicion that comes from experience, he knows the danger
of trying to take something of value from that which can harm him so greatly.
Yet he is both brave and foolish, so he tries.
Nanabush reasons that if Aboriginal rights emerged through the meeting of
two legal cultures, then Aboriginal rights must be litigated by reference to both
societies' laws. The Chief Justice would appear to agree: "[TIhe law of
[Alboriginal rights is 'neither English or [A]boriginal in origin: it is a form of
intersocietal law that evolved from long-standing practices linking the various
communities.""'  Yet, despite this endorsement of Aboriginal law, in
developing the "integral to a distinctive culture" test Nanabush observes that
the Chief Justice did not consult or apply Sto:lo, Nuu-Chah-Nulth, Heiltsuk or
Ojibway law in defining Aboriginal rights under section 35(1) of the
Constitution.'"
134. See Cote, 138 D.L.RAth 385, at para. 52 (Lamer, CJ.C.).
135. See Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, at para. 42 (Lamer, C.J.C.).
136. Id.
137. These communities have laws relating to selling fish and gambling that the Court could
receive and consider in developing its sui generis Aboriginal rights jurisprudence. These laws
'may be helpful by way of analogy" in defining and interpreting Aboriginal rights, see R. v.
Simon, 24 D.L.R.4th 390, 404 (Can. 1985).
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While the Court asserted that Aboriginal rights are based on traditional laws
and customs "passed down, and arising from, the pre-existing culture and
customs of [A]boriginal peoples,"'' nowhere in these cases does the Chief
Justice use the laws of the people charged, or the laws of any other Aboriginal
people, to arrive at the standards through which he will define these rights.'
As such, the Court does not use "intersocietal" law in developing its test for
Aboriginal rights." In so observing Nanabush has peered into the fire and
found a branch sufficiently dense in its grain to keep a flame burning while he
brings it back home to his people.
Nanabush reaches in through the smoke and observes that the Chief Justice
engaged in an abstract, theoretical approach to define Aboriginal rights. He did
not fully reference the "long-standing practices linking the various
communities" in defining Aboriginal rights."" Vacuous reasons about section
35(1) reconciling Crown assertions of sovereignty with the fact that Aboriginal
peoples were here first, may at the most elementary level qualify as an
application of intersocietal law. However, the idea that this reconciliation
should take place upon contact finds no support in either Aboriginal or non-
Aboriginal law. It is the Chief Justice's invention. Nanabush has firmly
grasped the branch and taken it from the fire. The smoke is clearing. Nanabush
then finds a confederate, quoting from Madam Justice McLachlin's dissent in
Vanderpeet, he states:
Aboriginal rights find their source not in a magic moment of
European contact, but in the traditional laws and customs of the
[A]boriginal people in question.... One finds no mention in the
text of s[ection] 35(1), or in the jurisprudence, of the moment of
European contact as the definitive all-or-nothing time for
establishing an [Alboriginal right."'
Nanabush finds in this statement a more substantial basis upon which to define
Aboriginal rights. A "morally and politically defensible conception of
[A]boriginal rights will incorporate both legal perspectives."'43  The
development of the "integral to a distinctive culture test" does not incorporate
either legal perspective because neither the common law nor Aboriginal laws
138. Id. at 40.
139. For an excellent discussion of the persistence of customary tribal law, see Gloria
Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REv. 225 (1994).
140. For a discussion of the diverse sources of law in Canada, including Aboriginal law, see
Patrick Glenn, The Common Law in Canada, 74 CAN. BAR REV. 261 (1995).
141. See Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, at para. 42 (Lamer, C.J.C.) (citing Brian Slaterly,
The Legal Basis ofAboriginal Title, in BRMSH COLUMBIA: DELGAMUUKW V. THE QUEEN 121-22
(1992)).
142. Id. at para. 247 (McLachlin, J.).
143. Id. at para. 42 (Lamer, C.J.C.).
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held that the "moment of European contact" was the "definitive" time for
establishing an Aboriginal right.
It is now time for Nanabush to run for home. The fires of his people are
almost extinguished. What he has found may re-kindle them. The common
law's recognition of Aboriginal ancestral laws and customs, and their
continual evolution and interaction with the Crown, is preferred as a basis for
defining Aboriginal rights because it is more in line with the existing case law
and the "time honoured methodology of the common law.""4  This
methodology follows a "golden thread" of case law which defines the nature
and incidents of Aboriginal rights by reference to the laws and customs of
Indigenous people.45 This methodology also fans the embers of Aboriginal
law and encourages its development as a greater source of authority for
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians."~ With this basis for defining
Aboriginal rights, the purpose of section 35(1) becomes truly "intersocietal."
It also strengthens the continued interaction of these laws because
Constitutional protection of the existing customary laws and rights of
Aboriginal peoples ensures that such customs and rights' remain in the
Aboriginal people until extinguished or surrendered by treaty. Since Aboriginal
rights rest on Aboriginal laws, section 35(1) must define these rights by
reference to these pre-existing laws.
While Nanabush steals fire, Peebon's chilling pervasiveness is felt all
around. Nanabush's solitary actions may not be enough to help the thaw. The
Supreme Court of Canada's interpretations of Aboriginal rights remain
restrictive and burdensome. The integral to a distinctive culture test freezes the
protection of practices which may have developed solely as response to
European cultures. Yet the adoption of new practices, traditions and laws in
response to new influences is always integral to the survival of any community
in its relations with another. Reconciliation should not require Aboriginal
peoples to concede those practices which allow them to survive as a
contemporary community. However, the Court's new test threatens Aboriginal
cultures precisely on this point, since in adapting to new situations they do not
have protection for the practices devised in meeting challenges solely as a
result of European influence. 47 Such a restriction is contrary to the Chief
Justice's assertion that "equal weight" be placed on Aboriginal lawt4 by
144. Id. at par. 261 (McLachlin, J.).
145. Id. at para. 265.
146. For supporting argument, see Sakej Henderson, First Nations Legal Inheritances: The
Mikmaq Model, 23 MAN. L.J. 1 (1996); Sakej Henderson, Micnaw Tenure in Atlantic Canada,
18 DALHOUSIE L.J. 196 (1995); Borrows II, supra note 82.
147. If reconciliation is to be used to define Aboriginal rights at all, a better approach to
reconciliation would have made 1982 the effective date for the definition of rights. The
Constituticn Act recognized and affirmed those rights which were existing in 1982, NOT at the
date when Europeans asserted sovereignty in what is now Canada.
148. Yee Vanderpeet, 137 D.L.R.4th 289, at paras. 59-60 (Lamer, CJ.C.).
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rendering it in terms "cognizable to Canadian law." The "integral to a
distinctive culture" test does not place equal weight on traditional Aboriginal
law, 49 and denids legal equality to Aboriginal peoples in their relationship
with Canada."
Peebon remains ascendant. His icy embrace chills. The dissolution and
decay continue. Throughout the land Aboriginal practices are coldly suspended.
Have to wait for the thaw again. It may be a long winter.
Conclusion
This comment has attempted to show how Aboriginal rights in Canada's
Constitution remain partial and incomplete. The Court's integral to a
distinctive culture test does not extend protection to aboriginal practices that
developed solely as a result of European influence - even if those practices are
crucial to their contemporary physical and cultural survival. Surely this result
is less than a full recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights. Aboriginal
peoples are entitled to expect legal protection for their existence as
communities and nations within North America. Otherwise, what is the value
of entrenching aboriginal rights in the Constitution if the societies these rights
were meant to protect cannot survive? Canadian courts have not yet come to
terms with the fact that, like others, Aboriginal people are traditional, modem
and post-modem. Physical and cultural survival depends as much on attracting
legal protection for contemporary activities, as it does on gaining recognition
for traditional practices. The courts need to recognize that aboriginal rights
attach to Aboriginal activities, whether making moccasins or marketing
computers. It is not specific practices that are necessarily important to the
definition of Aboriginal rights; what counts in determining Aboriginal rights
is whether these practices contribute to the survival of the group. The rights
exist first and foremost to protect the group, and are only incidentally
concerned with the protection of specific practices. However, the courts are
operating under the assumption that protecting specific "[A]boriginal" activities
satisfies the Constitutional purpose for the entrenchment of Aboriginal rights
(and they get to decide what is Aboriginal). They do not interpret aboriginal
in a "large, liberal and generous manner," with "sensitivity to the [A]boriginal
perspective on the meaning of the rights at stake."'' Thus, they interpret
149. The downgrading of Aboriginal rights is even more apparent in the greater power given
to Canadian governments to infringe Aboriginal rights in these cases. For further comment, see
Kent McNeil, How Can Infringements of the Constitutional Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples Be
Justified, 8 CONsT. F. 33 (1997).
150. For an argument which develops the equality of peoples as central to reconciling
Crown/Aboriginal relationships, see Patrick Macklem, Normative Dimensions of an Aboriginal
Right of Self-Government, QUEEN's LJ. 173 (1995); Patrick Macklem, Distributing Sovereignty:
Indian Nations and the Equality of Peoples, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1311 (1993).
151. See R. v. Sioui, 70 D.L.R.4th 427,453 (Can. 1990); R. v. Sparrow, 70 D.L.R.4th 385,
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Aboriginal in an incomplete way, and do not take account of their physical and
cultural survival in North America.
The courts need to embrace broader notions of Indian rights. As I have tried
to demonstrate, Native peoples of the Americas can use their intellectual
traditions to assist in this venture. Our ideologies and approaches to law may
yield important insights on the partiality of current legal discourse. The
trickster's deployment represents one such methodology and illustrates the
relevance of First Nations inquiry in understanding the law, Indigenous
traditions are not static and their strength lies in their ability to survive through
the power of tribal memory and renew themselves by incorporating new
elements.'" By intermingling these approaches with the law, the trickster and
other traditions can speak as strongly to the continent's dominant legal
institutions, as they can to long-standing tribal relationships. Their vitality and
authenticity points us beyond ourselves.'53 Their power lies not in how
closely they adhere to their original form, but in how well they are able to
develop and remain relevant under changing circumstances.'*
Aboriginal ideologies are jurisprudentially relevant in reflecting upon the
law in its general and specific contexts. Aboriginal ideologies, like Aboriginal
practices, are not frozen. Their practice is integral to the distinctive culture of
Aboriginal people today, even if these narratives may have developed as a
result of colonial influence. Their use is vital to physical and cultural survival.
The trickster is alive and well. His travels, insights and experiences still have
much to teach us about this survival.
404 (Can. 1990).
152. PENNY PETRONE, NATIVE LITERATURE IN CANADA: FROM ORAL TRADITION TO THE
PRESENT 17 (1990).
153. JARISLAV PELIKAN, THE VINDICATION OF TRADITION 54 (1984).
154. Katharine T. Barlett, Tradition, Change, and the Idea of Progress in Feminist Legal
Thought, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 303, 306-19.
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